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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S'l\\TE OF t:TAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLOYD REED ALLRED, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10068 
ST.ATE~IENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action in which appellant was 
charged with the commission of burglary in the second 
degree and grand larceny. 
DISPOSITIOX IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a criminal jury from a ver-
dict finding appellant guilty of both burglary in the 
second degree and grand larceny. The appellant appeals 
through his court appointed counsel. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction, as a 
matter of law, or failing that, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 3:00 o'clock a.m. in the morning 
of September 5, 1963, Kim's Market, located in Cop-
perton, Utah, was forcibly entered and certain items of 
property removed by two unidentified individuals who 
were seen by a tenant, residing in the upstairs apart-
ments, leaving the market ( tr. 51). No identification 
was possible from any witness as they were between 
fifty and seventy-five feet from the tenant's window 
(tr. 52). No witness was able to recognize the defend-
ant (tr. 53). Ruth Goff, owner of the business, had 
secured the market doors at about 8:00 o'clock p.m. 
prior to the entry (tr. 61). Upon arrival, witness Goff 
observed that the front door had been forced open (tr. 
61). The owner claimed that a quantity of cigarettes, 
a .38 caliber pistol, a pair of safety boots, a pair of cover-
alls and a radio, having a value in excess of Fifty Dol-
lars ( $50.00), were missing ( tr. 60, 61), upon investiga-
tion and invntory the following morning. Mrs. Goff also 
testified that the store's check book was missing, along 
with the check protector (tr. 69, 70). She identified 
State's Exhibit No. 4 as one of the checks which had 
been taken out of the check book ( tr. 70), as well as 
the safety boots, coveralls and gun. (Exhibits 1, 2 and 
3). 
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These exhibits were introduced in evidence over 
the ohjcdion of defendant's counsel who had, prior to 
the trial. filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the 
grounds that the items had been obtained through il-
legal search and seizure of the defendant's car and his 
apartment ( tr. 2). The hearing on that phase of the 
case took place at 9 :};') o'clock a.m., October 16, 1963, 
hd'orc .Judge Yan Cott who, after hearing defendant's 
evidence, overruled his motion and ordered the trial to 
proceed (tr. 32-49). 
The testimony supporting defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence showed that about noon on Sep-
tember 6, 1963, Deputy Sheriff Paul LaBounty, while 
making a routine investigation following the alleged 
burglary, without search warrants or warrant for arrest 
ot' the defendant, spotted the defendant driving an 
automobile near Seventh South and Third East Streets, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and attempted to overtake him 
(tr. 35). The defendant parked the car he was driving 
at 314 East Seventh South and ran away from the 
Deputy. ~Ir. LaBounty searched the car, found the 
boots and coveralls allegedly taken from Kim's Market 
( tr. 36) . The Deputy claimed this evidence was in plain 
sight on the front seat, whereas, the defendant testified 
it was in the trunk compartment and further explained 
that he had obtained the items the night before from a 
friend. The car was not impounded ( tr. 37) . The 
Deputy n1ade no effort to obtain a search warrant, but 
took the boots and coveralls into his possession. Some-
time during the 6th or 7th of September, 1963, the 
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Sheriff made two visits to defendant's apartment with-
out the consent of defendant. A companion, who lived 
in the apartment with the defendant, allowed the Sheriff 
to search the apartment without a search warrant. On 
the second visit, the Sheriff had obtained a search war-
rant and at this time located a .38 caliber pistol (tr. 
41). The search warrant included a description of the 
boots and coveralls which had previously been im-
pounded. Donald Madsen, a companion of the defend-
ant who resided there along with four or five other 
individuals, allowed LaBounty to search the apartment 
(tr. 44). 
The defendant, upon learning that a warrant for 
his arrest was outstanding, voluntarily turned himself 
in after first arranging for a bail bondsman. Witnesses 
for the State testified that defendant did not confess 
or admit participation in the crime of burglary in the 
second degree or grand larceny, only that defendant 
claimed he had received this property in good faith, 
learning later that it had been stolen and that was the 
reason for his voluntarily turning himself over to the 
authorities. 
Witness Robert L. Nelson, operator of the Shop-
pers Market, at 1506 East 4160 South, identified the 
defendant as the person who presented State's Exhibit 
No. 4, the stolen check, to him. No criminal charge was 
filed on the stolen check against this defendant, nor was 
the defendant charged with the crime of receiving stolen 
property. 
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The jury returned guilty verdicts for each charge 
( b·. W. tr. 18). Judge \'an Cott, on his own motion, 
ordered the jury verdict of guilty of the crime of burg-
lary in the second degree vacated and set aside and 
dismissed that count of the information on October 17, 
19ti:J ( tr. 28) on the grounds that the State had failed 
to prove said charge of burglary in the second degree 
ugainst the defendant. The defendant was sentenced 
on October 28, 1963, to the Utah State Prison for the 
indeterminate term as provided by law for the crime 
of grand larceny, and the commitment issued November 
I, 1963. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SFPPORT THE VERDICT THAT THE DE-
FEXD.ANT 'VAS GUILTY OF THE CRIME 
OF GR.A.ND LARCENY. 
In view of the court's own motion setting aside the 
guilty verdict of the jury on the crime of burglary in 
the second degree, it would seem to follow that the 
court should have directed a verdict of not guilty on that 
charge and not submitted that charge to the jury. The 
court's failure to do so amounted to prejudicial error 
and certainly influenced the jury in its guilty verdict 
on the grand larceny charge. Viewed in this perspective 
and the presumption (76-38-1 UCA 1953) that posses-
sion of property recently stolen, when the person in 
possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation, 
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shall be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt and in 
the absence of such instruction to the jury, following 
76-38-1, the State did not establish the necessary ele-
ments to constitute larcency. (State v. Merritt., 67 
Utah 325, 247 Pac. 497, 501). Absent proof of felo-
nious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving 
away of the personal property of another, the jury 
could not infer that the defendant committed the lar-
ceny unless it considered that defendant had an unex-
plainable possession of property recently stolen. The 
case, however, was not submitted to the jury on the 
theory of recent possession of stolen property. 
There was absolutely no evidence identifying the 
defendant with the forcible entry into the market and 
no proof of the necessary elements to make out the 
crime of larceny, except possession of the boots and 
coveralls. Defendant was not charged with receiving 
stolen property (76-38-12 UCA 1953) which is pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years, whereas, grand larceny is punishable by a term 
not exceeding ten years. 
The obvious doubt in the mind of the trial court 
in setting aside the burglary conviction must also favor 
the same doubt concerning the elements of grand lar-
ceny and where, as here, the case was not submitted 
on the theory of recent possession of stolen property, 
the conviction should be set aside. 
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED, AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW, IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
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~lOTIO.\' TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ILLE-
G..:\.LLY OBT.t-\l.NED BY THE STATE AND 
1~ .:\LLO\\'ING TilE STATE TO INTRO-
lJl'l'E SUCH EYIDENCE. 
On June 19, 1961, the Supreme Court of the 
l Tnited States in illapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 
:!d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, in a landmark decision, over-
ruling its earlier decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 
:.!5, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1395, held that, as a matter 
of due process, evidence obtained by a search and seizure 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible 
in a state court as it is in a federal court. In the instant 
case, the State, without a proper warrant, obtained pos-
session of the boots and coveralls and, still without a 
proper warrant, searched the defendant's apartment. 
The fact that Deputy Sheriff LaBounty later obtained 
a warrant when he searched the apartment the second 
time to locate the gun does not cure his action. 
It will be recalled that no warrant for defendant's 
arrest was outstanding at the time, nor had he com-
mitted any crime in the presence of the officer when, 
more than thirty-two hours later, he was chased down 
by the officer on Third East Street. Defendant's car 
could haYe been impounded and a search warrant ob-
tained without jeopardy or prejudice to the State's 
interest. This was not done. The officer illegally took 
possession of the coveralls and boots and paved the way 
for subsequent State search for the gun. 
In the past. this court has been reluctant to over-
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turn convictions based upon such questionably obtained 
evidence, but now the Supreme Court of the United 
States has issued its mandate, and this court should 
hold that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress such evidence 
and permitting such evidence to be introduced at the 
trial. 
POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN IN-
STRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
The court's instruction No. 7 to the jury: 
"You are instructed that evidence has been 
offered and received in this case that the defend-
ant on or about the time of the commission of this 
offense took flight from a sheriff here in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. This, if you find it to be 
true, is a circumstance to be weighed by you as 
tending in some degree to prove consciousness of 
guilt and is entitled to more or less weight ac-
cording to the circumstances of the particular 
case. It is not sufficient of itself to establish the 
guilt of the defendant, but the weight to which 
that circumstance is entitled is a matter for you 
to determine in connection with all of the other 
facts and circumstances in the case." 
was in error in that it indicated to the jury that the 
defendant on or about the time of the commission of this 
offense took flight from a sheriff here in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. The offense was committed at about 3:00 
o'clock a.m., September 5, 1963. The incident of the 
defendant's flight from Deputy LaBounty was some 
twenty-eight hours later, on September 6, 1963. Under 
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this instruction the jury was told, in effect, that the 
deft'ndant was in fresh flight from the offense and was 
not instructed to also consider the fact that after the 
defendant learned that a warrant for his arrest had 
been issued, he voluntarily surrendered himself to 
authorities, after first arranging for a bail bond. The 
tlefendant had commited no crime on September 6, 
19H:J. and the officer was merely interested in interro-
gating hi1n as a part of his investigation. His flight, 
under such circu1nstances, should not have been weighed 
as a circumstance by the jury indicating guilt or a lack 
of guilt. 
Following the court's instruction and the argu-
ments of counsel on behalf of the State and the defend-
ant to the jury, the court gave an additional instruction, 
X o. 8 (a) , which provided: 
"Counsel and Members of the Jury: I have 
one more instruction that I am going to give 
you. It is in reference to this matter of the ex-
hibit, that is, the check in question . 
.... You are instructed that the defendant is not 
charged with the issuance of a bad check in this 
matter. but if the evidence in reference to the 
check is found by you of value in the solution of 
the burglary charged and the grand larceny 
charged herein, you may consider that evidence 
in the solution of these charges for which the 
defendant has been charged, even though you 
may find or believe that it might show evidence 
of another crime not charged here. 
"The fact that it might show another charge, 
if you thought it did, does not render it incom-
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petent for your consideration in reference to the 
charges for which the defendant is here standing 
trial." 
Why the court gave such an instruction is not 
clear from the record. It was, however, excepted to by 
counsel for defendant ( tr. 127). The prejudice in such 
exception is clear and obvious. In effect, the court has 
said that while the defendant is not charged with the 
issuance of the bad check (Exhibit No. 4), the jury 
may consider that evidence in determining defendant's 
guilt on the burglary and grand larceny charges. There 
the court should have ended its instruction, but it went 
on to add, "even though you may find or believe that 
it might show evidence of another crime not charged 
here." In effect the court was indicating to the jury 
by this additional comment that the court felt that the 
defendant was guilty of a bad check charge. The court 
should not have given such instruction. Witness Nel-
son only identified the defendant as the person who 
presented the check to his establishment. There was no 
other evidence that defendant received any money or 
had uttered the instrument. While his possession of that 
check may have been possession of recently stolen prop-
erty, the jury was not instructed to consider this theory 
of the State's case. Total effect of such instruction is 
prejudicial to the defendant in that it led the jury to 
believe that the defendant may also have been guilty of 
a bad check charge, even though that crime was not 
being tried. 
The court's lengthy instruction No.3 is also object-
ed to for the reason that the jury was not instructed to 
10 
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consider defendant's explanation of the recently stolen 
property in his possession from which the prima facie 
prtsumption of grand larceny arises as a matter of law. 
Instruction No. 6 was also faulty in that it allowed 
the jury to speculate on the value of various items to 
make the determination that the goods exceeded the 
value of Fifty Dollars ($50.00), and in this regard the 
jury considered a portable radio and an unknown quan-
tity of cigarettes as part of the corpus delicti, where 
the proof on the taking of these items was insufficient 
to go to the jury. The boots have a value of Fifteen 
Dollars ($15.00) and the coveralls, about Six Dollars 
( $6.00). No competent evidence as to the value of the 
gun was shown. It is submitted that the court should 
have specified the particular items, making up the 
corpus delicti, in order to arrive at the statutory value. 
CONCLUSION 
As a court appointed counsel, I believe there is 
merit to this appeal, and I believe the appeal should be 
sustained and the conviction set aside as a matter of 
law on the basis of the specifications of error above 
stated. 
Respectfully submitted this ·1.-t..day of May, 1964. 
DRAPER, SAXDACK & SAPERSTEIN 
A. 'V ally Sandack 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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ADDENDUM 
• I 
Since the above brief was filed, counsel's 
attention has been called to two recent cases decidec 
by the Supreme Court of the United States appearing 
in United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' 
Edition, Volume 11, April 13, 1964, which further 
support appellant's Point 2, Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
See Preston v. United States, 11 L. ed. 2d, 
777, and Stoner v. California, 11 L. ed. 2d 856, 
which extend/the doctrine of illegal search and 
seizure to the automobile and hotel rooms of the 
defendant. 
.,  
. .! 
This Addendum dated this lOth day of 
June, 1964. 
DRAPER, SANDACK & SAPERSTEil' 
A. Wally Sandack 
I 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to A. Pratt 
Kesler, Attorney General of Utah, State Capitol 
Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah, and to Jay Banks, 
District Attorney, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, attorneys for.,.~ ponde.· n.ct this l.Oth day 
of June, 1964. / / 
. ~-- .. ·-!I./- . J ~ · , I~ h '~'----:f!/ . .z-£/ /'I ( 
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